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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In her Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hurles argued that the district court erred
when it determined that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege.
Ms. Hurles also argued that the district court's restitution award was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence, and that it erred when it included civil attorney fees
in the restitution award. This brief is necessary to reply to the State's assertion that
Ms. Hurles abandoned her claim based on the accountant-client privilege. This brief is
also necessary to reply to the State's assertion that the district court's restitution order
was supported by substantial and competent evidence, as well as its assertion that civil
attorneys' fees are awardable as restitution because there is a causal relationship
between those fees and Ms. Hurles' criminal behavior.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Hurles' Revised Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief,
but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES

1. Did the district court err when it concluded that the Morrisons did not implicitly
waive the accountant-client privilege?
2. Was the district court's restitution calculation supported by substantial and
competent evidence?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it included civil attorneys' fees as
part of the restitution awarded in the criminal proceeding?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Morrisons Did Not Implicitly
Waive The Accountant-Client Privilege

Ms. Hurles did not abandon her claim of error related to the district court's
conclusion that the Morrisons could invoke the accountant-client privilege.

At the

second restitution hearing, Ms. Hurles called the Morrisons' accountant, Mr. Warr, to
testify and the Morrisons invoked the accountant-client privilege. (08/04/11 Tr., p.10,
L.13 - p.12, L.12.)

After hearing a brief argument, the district court ruled that the

Morrisons' appropriately invoked the accountant-client privilege and excused Mr. Warr
from the hearing.

(08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.16 - p.16, L.1.) The restitution hearing was

continued, and at the final restitution/sentencing hearing, trial counsel proffered
additional reasons why the court should revisit its prior ruling about the applicability of
the accountant-client privilege. (08/11/11 Tr., p.96, L.5 - p.98, L.7.) The district court
then stated that if trial counsel would like the court to revisit the privilege issue, trial
counsel had thirty days to file a motion. (08/11/11 Tr., p.98, L.9 - p.99, L.1.) The district
court then imposed all of the restitution requested by the State. (08/11/11 Tr., p.103,
Ls.9-12.)

Trial counsel never filed a renewed motion challenging the trial court's

accountant-client privilege ruling.
Based on the foregoing facts, the State argues that Ms. Hurles abandoned her
ability to challenge the district court's ruling on the privilege issue on appeal because
Ms. Hurles never filed a motion to revisit the district court's prior ruling. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.5-9.)

In support of this position, the State cites State v.
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Barnes

133 Idaho 378 (1999). In that case, the defendant filed a suppression motion but never
followed up on it, and it was never ruled on by the district court. Id. at 384. The Idaho
Supreme Court refused to address the suppression issue on appeal because an
appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the record
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error."' Id.
(quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485 (1993)). However, this case is inapposite,
as there were multiple rulings on the privilege issue. The first ruling occurred at the
second restitution hearing, where the accountant-client privilege was invoked, the
district court found a privilege existed, and the district court excused Mr. Warr from
testifying. (08/04/11 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.16, L.1.) The second ruling on the issue occurred
when the district court imposed the full amount of restitution at the sentencing hearing.
(08/11/11 Tr., p.103, Ls.9-12; R., pp.71-72.) While the State argues that Ms. Hurles
abandoned her claim, that is not an accurate as the district court ruled on the privilege
issue and imposed all of the restitution requested by the State.

The district court's

decision to allow the defense to file a motion was, in substance, an invitation for
Ms. Hurles to file a motion for reconsideration of the district court's prior ruling on the
accountant-client privilege issue.
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11.

The District Court's Restitution Calculation Was Not Supported By Substantial And
Competent Evidence

The main issue identified by Ms. Hurles in support of her argument that the
restitution award was not supported by substantial and competent evidence is that the
State's restitution calculation failed to consider the fact that Ms. Hurles only took ten to
twenty percent of the cashed checks and placed the remaining proceeds into the ATM.
(Revised Appellant's Brief, p.26.) In response, the State argues that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it disregarded Ms. Hurles' "non-credible" version of
events. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.) Contrary to the State's assertion on appeal,
the State never contested below the fact that Ms. Hurles only took ten to twenty percent
of the checks she cashed. In fact, Jody Morrison conceded that Ms. Hurles only took a
percentage of the checks she cashed.

The following dialogue occurred at the first

restitution hearing:

Q [defense counsel]: So what I'm saying is, isn't it possible that Ms. Hurles
wasn't cashing all of these checks but, instead, returning a significant
portion back to the bar.
A [Ms. Morrison): I think that she's already admitted in her PSI that she
would take checks to the bank and cash them, and a portion of that
proceeds would go into the ATM. So I think that's pretty clear.
(05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.)

Ms. Hurles provided the following explanation of her

actions in the PSI:
Ms. Hurles admitted that she had taken money from the ATM. She
supported that she did this by cashing petty cash checks that were
supposed to be used to fill the ATM. She said she would put some of the
money in the ATM but keep some for herself. Ms. Hurles used the
example of (verbatim), "If I cashed a check for $500, ·1 would put $400 or
so into the ATM and then pocket the rest."
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(PSI, p.7.) As mentioned in the Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Berriochoa 1 testified that
the $153,920.00 amount was based on the total amount of the checks, but that total did
not take into account the fact that Ms. Hurles deposited_ between eighty to ninety
percent of the checks' proceeds into the ATM. (05/19/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-18.) As such,
the district court's ultimate restitution award of $155,440.00 2 is not supported by
substantial and competent evidence, as Mr. Morrison agreed that Ms. Hurles did not
take the full amount of the checks she cashed and the ultimate restitution award did not
take that uncontested fact into consideration.
To the extent that the State argues on appeal that Ms. Hurles took the total
amount of the cashed checks, it is important to note that there is no evidence in the
record indicating as such.

In fact, the only evidence in the record are Ms. Hurles'

statements in the PSI (PSI, p.7.) and the testimony of Ms. Morrison where she agreed
with defense counsel that Ms. Hurles returned a significant portion of the proceeds of
the cashed checks back to the No Lawyers Bar. (05/19/11 Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.)
Ms. Hurles also argued in her Revised Appellant's Brief that the restitution order
should not include losses between 2005 and November of 2008, because Ms. Hurles
only pleaded guilty to events which occurred between December 2008 and December
of 2009, and the events which occurred prior to December of 2008 are not causally
related to the criminal acts for which she was convicted.

(Revised Appellant's Brief,

pp.26-29.) The State responds by arguing that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay for losses that

1

Ms. Berriochoa is the paralegal from Givens Pursley that created the spreadsheet
utilized by the State for its restitution calculation.
2 The district court also awarded as part of the restitution an additional amount of
$48,734.61 for civil attorney fees.
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the Morrisons allegedly incurred between 2005 and November of 2008. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.23-25.)

In support of this position, the State relies on the transcript of the

change of plea hearing where the State said that it "is going to seek restitution of all
DRs that were disclosed in discovery." (02/17/11 Tr., p.1, Ls.21-22.) Ms. Hurles still
stands behind her argument in the Revised Appellant's Brief. However, assuming that
the State's contention has merit, the term relied on by the State is far too ambiguous to
draw the conclusion that Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for the losses which
allegedly occurred between 2005 and November of 2008.
"Idaho Code § 19-5304(9) permits the court, 'with the consent of the parties,' to
enter an order for restitution to the victim or others 'for economic loss or injury for crimes
which are not adjudicated or are not before the court."' State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370,
373 (Ct. App. 2007).

There are various reasons why the State's assertion that

Ms. Hurles agreed to pay restitution for uncharged conduct is problematic. First, the
State said it wanted to "seek" restitution "on all DRs that were disclosed in discovery."
(02/17/11 Tr., p.1,Ls.21-22.) The mere fact that the State is going to seek restitution for
certain amounts does not mean that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for
those amounts. See State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495-498 (Ct. App. 2012).
More importantly, the foregoing "terms" of the plea agreement are far too
ambiguous to be enforceable against Ms. Hurles. "[W]here the language of [a] plea
agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the defendant."
State v. Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2013). "In determining whether a contract

is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations." Id.
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The term "DRs" is ambiguous because it is not defined anywhere in the record. It
could be a reference to the dismissed charge.

This would be consistent with the

State's comment at the end of the change of plea hearing where the State said that the
restitution amount "will include the dismissed charge as well." (02/17/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.1417.)

It could be a reference to restitution for an unrelated case.

This would be

consistent with the guilty plea advisory form where Ms. Hurles indicated that she had
agreed to pay restitution in another case. (R., p.40.) One could speculate as to various
meaning of "DRs," as that term is not defined in the record and the State never
attempted to define that term at the change of plea hearing.

Since there are a

multitude of meanings for the phrase "DRs" there is an ambiguity which should be
resolved in Ms. Hurles favor. As such, Ms. Hurles argues that the phrase "DRs" is a
reference to the dismissed charge, the restitution for which she did not challenge below
and she is not challenging on appeal.
Additionally, the State's use of the word seek restitution for the all the DRs
creates another ambiguity. As mentioned above, the word seek could mean that the
State will attempt to request restitution. However, that term does not necessarily mean
that Ms. Hurles expressly agreed to pay restitution for everything the State was seeking.
See Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-498 (holding that the phrase "Restitution is not to
exceed $1,156.98" meant that the State's restitution request was capped at $1,156.98).
Due to this ambiguity, Ms. Hurles argues that the word seek should be construed in
Ms. Hurles' favor and merely functions as a cap on the amount of restitution the State
can request.
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In sum, the State's characterization of Ms. Hurles' version of events as being
"non-credible" is not supported by the record, as the State's witness agreed that
Ms. Hurles only took a portion of the proceeds from the cashed checks. Additionally,
Ms. Hurles only pleaded guilty to taking money between December of 2008 to
December 2009 and the restitution award for alleged losses which falls outside of the
foregoing dates is not causally related to Ms. Hurles' criminal behavior. Alternatively,
and in the event this Court concludes that Ms. Hurles might have agreed to pay for
those losses, the ambiguity of the terms "DRs" and "seeks" should be construed in
Ms. Hurles' favor.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Included Civil Attorney Fees As Part Of
The Restitution Awarded In The Criminal Proceeding

In her Revised Appellant's Brief, Ms. Hurles argued that the district court erred
when it awarded civil attorney fees, over her objection, because they have been defined
as non-economic damages by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Parker, 143 Idaho
165 (Ct. App. 2006).

In response, the State cites State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599

(2011 ), for the proposition that the Court of Appeals' holding in Parker was implicitly
overruled and that the State need only to establish causation in order for restitution to
be awardable pursuant I.C. § 19-5304. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-32.) The State's
reliance on Corbus is misplaced, as that case merely dealt with causation in the context
of economic loss and Parker was dealing with the definition of what constitutes noneconomic loss. These two cases deal with entirely separate issues.
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Idaho Code Section 19-5304 allows a court to award damages for economic
losses,

but expressly precludes a restitution

award

for non-economic losses.

Specifically, I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a) defines economic loss as including, but not being
limited to, "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost
wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses
resulting from the criminal conduct .... " I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). Idaho Code Section 195304(1 )(a) goes on to expressly exclude restitution awards based on "less tangible
damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress." I.C. § 195304(1 )(a). In Parker, the question before the Court of Appeals was whether attorney
fees constituted economic loss under I.C. § 19-5304. Parker, 143 Idaho at 167-168.
The Court of Appeals first noted that one of the main purposes behind the restitution
statute was to "obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a
separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." Id. at 167. The
Court of Appeals then concluded that the "prevention of future harm" does not constitute
economic loss. Id. at 168.
In Corbus, the question before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the injuries
a passenger sustained after jumping out of a moving vehicle were proximately caused
by the driver's crime of reckless driving. In that case, police observed Corbus driving a
vehicle approximately sixty five miles an hour in a thirty five mile an hour zone. Corbus,
150 Idaho at 601.

A high speed chase ensued and the passenger jumped out of

Corbus' vehicle while the car was going approximately fifty miles per hour.

Id.

The

district court awarded restitution to the passenger for the injuries which resulted from
jumping out of Corbus' car. Id. Corbus appealed and the issue on appeal was whether
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the restitution was awardable under the restitution statute or, in other words, whether
there was a causal connection between Corbus' criminal activity and the passenger's
injuries. Id. at 601-602. The Idaho Supreme Court then employed a detailed analysis
of causation dealing with both actual cause and proximate cause. However, the Corbus
Opinion never dealt with the issue of whether the restitution at issue was economic or
non-economic loss. As such, the State's implicit assertion that Corbus overruled Parker
is without merit because those cases were dealing with separate issues.
If the State's position is taken to its logical end, it would allow for the restitution
awards for non-economic damages which are expressly precluded in I.C. § 19-5304.
As mentioned above, the State argues, based on Corbus, that the only applicable
question when determining whether restitution is awardable pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304
is if causation exists. This argument is misplaced, because the question of whether the
damages are economic or non-economic must first be answered. See I.C. § 19-5304.
It is only after it has been determined that the damages at issue are economic losses
that the causation issue addressed in Corbus becomes relevant because if it is
determined that the damages at issue are non-economic they are not awardable and
the issue of causation becomes irrelevant. The State invites this Court to ignore the
question of whether the damages at issue are economic or non-economic and only
focus on the question of causation. If the State's position is taken to its logical extreme
then a victim could file a civil action to recover non-economic wrongful death damages
and the district court, in the criminal case, could award attorney fees incurred in the civil
action as part of the restitution award.

Such a result is contrary to I.C. § 19-5304's

express language.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Hurles respectfully requests that this case be remanded for another
restitution hearing with instructions that the district court allow Mr. Warr to testify and
that restitution only be ordered for the thefts which occurred from December 2008 to
December of 2009. Ms. Hurles also requests an instruction consistent with this Court's
rulings on the issues relating to the civil attorneys' fees.

In the event this Court

determines that the Morrisons did not waive the accountant-client privilege, or any other
claim of error is deemed meritless, Ms. Hurles alternatively requests that this case be
remanded for new restitution hearing with applicable instructions as to any of
Ms. Hurles' prevailing claims of error.

DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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